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ZADVYDAS V. DAVIS
533 U.S. 678 (2001).
FACTS
This case involves two separate alien detention cases which were
consolidated for argument in front of the United States Supreme Court.' Both
cases involve resident aliens who, after gaining admission to the United States,
were subsequently ordered to be removed by the Immigration and
Naturalization Service ("INS").2 The post-removal period detention statute,
8 U.S.C. § 1231 (a)(6),3 mandates the detention, for up to 90 days, of aliens
who have been ordered to be removed from the United States.4 Upon
expiration of the 90-day detention period, the Government may continue to
detain an alien if, upon review of the alien's file, the INS District Director
determines that either the alien represents a threat to the community, or the
alien poses a risk of flight if released.5 After the expiration of the 90-day
removal period, the burden is on the alien to prove, to the satisfaction of the
Attorney General, that he is neither a flight risk nor a danger to the
community.6
The first case the Court reviewed involved Kestutis Zadvydas, a resident
alien, who was ordered to be removed from the U.S. when he was released on
parole after serving two years of a 16-year sentence for possession of cocaine
with intent to distribute.7 Zadvydas was born to Lithuanian parents in a
displaced person camp in Germany.' All attempts by the INS to deport
Zadvydas failed.9 Both Germany and Lithuania refused to accept him because
he was not a citizen of either country." Consequently, Zadvydas could not be
removed from the United States, and was detained past the 90-day removal
period."
Zadvydas challenged his detention by filing a writ of habeas corpus in
1. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
2. Zadvydas v. Underdown, 185 F. 3d 279 (5th Cir. 1999); Ma v. Reno, 208 F. 3d 815 (9th Cir.
2000).
3. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(aX6) (2001). "Inadmissible or criminal aliens. An alien ordered removed who
is inadmissible under section 212 [8 U.S.C. § 1182, removable under section 237(a)(1)(C), 237(a)(2), or
237(a)(4); 8 U.S.C. § 1227, (a)(l)(C), (aX2), or (aX4)] or who has been determined by the Attorney General
to be a risk to the community or unlikely to comply with the order of removal, may be detained beyond the
removal period and, if released, shall be subject to the terms of supervision in paragraph (3)."
4. Id..
5. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 683..
6. Id.
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1997.12 The District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana granted the
writ, and ordered Zadvydas to be released under supervision. 3 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the lower court's ruling,
and sustained the order detaining Zadvydas past the 90-day detention period.'4
The court ruled that the detention of Zadvydas beyond the 90-day removal
period did not violate the United States Constitution because eventual
deportation was still possible, and the United States was making good faith
efforts to deport him.'5 According to the Court of Appeals, the INS could
legally detain an alien, who is currently under an order of removal, past the
removal period if it believes the alien represents either a threat to the
community or a significant risk of flight, and is still making good faith efforts
to deport them.'
6
The second case involved Kim Ho Ma, a Cambodian who had been a
resident alien in the United States since the age of seven.'7 During his stay in
the United States, Ma was involved in a gang-related shooting and was
sentenced to 38-months imprisonment." After serving two years of his
sentence, he was released to the INS and was subsequently ordered removed. 9
Ma proved to be non-deportable due to the absence of a repatriation treaty
between Cambodia and the United States.20 The INS detained Ma beyond the
90-day removal period because it believed Ma would represent a threat to the
community if released due to his prior gang involvement and his defiant
activities while incarcerated.1
Ma filed a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 224122 and was
released by a panel of judges sitting on the Federal District Court for the
Western District of Washington.23 The court held that the Constitution forbids
the post-detention-period detention of a person when there appears to be no
reasonable chance of deportation.24 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court's ruling and held that the post-
removal-period detention statute only authorized the detainment of aliens for
12. United States v. Zadvydas, 986 F. Supp. 1011 (E.D. LA. 1997).
13. See id (holding that because Zadvydas' detention would continue indefinitely, any further
detention without possibility of removal constituted violation of due process).
14. Zadvydas v. Underdown, 185 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 1999).
15. Id.
16. Id.





22. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2001).
23. Ma, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 1165.
24. Id. at !165.
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a "reasonable time" past the 90-day removal period.2 5 Given the fact that there
was no repatriation treaty between the United States and Cambodia, the Ninth
Circuit determined that detention after the 90-day period was unreasonable,
and therefore in violation of 8 U.S.C.S. § 1231 (a)(6).26
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in both cases, in order
to decide whether the Attorney General could constitutionally detain
removable aliens beyond the 90-day removal period if there was no reasonable
probability that the Government would be able to actually deport them.
HOLDING
The United States Supreme Court vacated both thejudgments of the Fifth
Circuit and Ninth Circuit, holding that detention of aliens who have been
ordered to be removed but have no reasonable likelihood of removal is not
authorized by 8 U.S.C.S. § 123 1(a)(6).2" The Court interpreted § 123 1(a)(6)
to contain an implicit "reasonable time" limitation of six months, which would
be subject to federal court review.29 Longer confinement is only authorized for
the purpose of effectuating removal and protecting the public at large. The
Court held that once removal has proved to be impossible or highly unlikely,
further detention is unreasonable and therefore unauthorized by the statute.3
ANALYSIS
The Court recognized that a statute that permits indefinite detention raises
serious constitutional issues.32 The Fifth Amendment's Due Process clause
forbids the federal government to deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law.33 Government detention violates the
Due Process Clause unless adequate procedural protections have been afforded
or, in non-punitive proceedings, special circumstances outweigh the
individual's constitutionally protected interest.
34
Whenever the Court is faced with problems that raise serious
constitutional concerns it is customary to interpret the statute narrowly to
25. Ma v. Reno, 208 F. 3d 815 (9th Cir. 2000).
26. Ma, 208 F. 3d at 815.
27. Zadvydas v. Underdown, 531 U.S. 923 (2000) (granting certiorari).
28. Zadvydas, 553 U.S. at 702.
29. Id at 701.
30. Id.
31. ld. at 702.
32. Id. at 690.
33. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
34. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
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avoid the question of constitutionality.35 In order to avoid the substantive
constitutional problems potentially contained in the statutory language, the
Court inferred a limitation on the government's power to sustain post-removal-
period detention of an alien to a period reasonably necessary to ensure the
alien's removal.36
The Court then analyzed the statute, reading in this limitation, in terms of
the two stated regulatory purposes of post-removal-period detention. 37 The
stated justifications for continued detention are to ensure that the alien is
available for deportation and to prevent possible harm to society if the alien
were to be released.38
The Court denied the legitimacy of petitioner Zadvydas' and respondent
Ma's continued detention on the grounds that it did not serve either of the
stated purposes of the statute, those being prevention of harm to society and
avoiding pre-removal flight.39  The Court found that the first statutory
justification, preventing pre-removal flight, was no longer served when it
became clear that deportation was no longer feasible.4" This was because it
was no longer necessary for the government to ensure an alien's appearance
at the time of deportation once deportation had been deemed virtually
impossible.4 The Court analyzed the second justification, preventing danger
to society, and ruled that once removal is unlikely, detention on those grounds
is only permissible with the existence of "special circumstances,"42 and then
only after substantial procedural protections have been afforded.43
The Court determined that the post-removal-period provision was too
broad because it did not limit indefinite detention to special circumstances and
could be interpreted to apply even to persons who were held for minor
infractions, such as tourist visa violations." The Court was also concerned
with the limited procedural safeguards available to the detained alien, which
35. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 689; see also Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Measured Constitutional Steps, 71
IND. L.J. 297 (1996) (explaining the doctrine of constitutional avoidance as directing judges to construe
issues in such a way as to avoid unnecessarily raising constitutional questions).
36. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 689.
37. Id. at690-691.
38. Id. at 690.
39. Id. at 690-691.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) (holding special circumstances such as past
violent sexual behavior could be sufficient to warrant further detention); see Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 691
(identifying suspected links to terrorists and mental illness as other special circumstances which could
warrant additional detention in protection of society); see also Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11
(1905) (holding that an individual's constitutionally protected liberty interests may be overridden even in
a civil context).
43. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 692.
44. Id.
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under the statute were limited to an administrative hearing.45 During such an
administrative hearing, the alien bears the burden of proof that he or she is not
dangerous." In addition, the Court noted that there exists little significant
appellate review of the hearing's ruling.47 This structure makes it difficult for
detained aliens to get adequate protection against unconstitutional deprivations
of due process.48
The Government argued that, under the Constitution, alien status alone
could justify indefinite detention under Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel.
Meze 9.5 ° In Mezei, the Court held that the continued exclusion of an alien
being held on Ellis Island for 21 months without a hearing did not constitute
unlawful detention.5 The Court distinguished Mezei from the present cases
because in Mezei, the alien had been stopped at the border before being
allowed to enter the country.2 Since Mezei had not yet gained admission to
the country, he was not entitled to the same protections as persons within the
United States under the Constitution." The Court pointed out that although
all persons within the United States are entitled to the protections afforded by
the Constitution, those who are stopped at the border are not yet within this
class.54
The Government further argued that Congress has plenary power to
determine the law with relation to immigration, and therefore the judiciary
must afford substantial deference to legislative judgment in this area.5" The
Court clarified that Congressional power is subject to the judicially enforced
limitations set forth by the Constitution.56 The Court stated that the
Government was mischaracterizing the issue as one of whether admitted aliens
have a right to remain against the national will despite Congress' plenary
power.57 The true issue, the Court stated, was whether the Government can
constitutionally subject non-removable aliens to indefinite terms of
incarceration under 8 U.S.C.S. § 123 l(a)(6).58 Just disposition of these cases
did not require inquiry into the legislature's power to regulate immigration, but
45. Id.
46. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231.
47. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 692.
48. Id.
49. 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
50. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 692.
51. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
52. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 692-693.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 694.
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rather solely into the substantive limitations placed by the Due Process Clause
upon the Attorney General's discretion in respect to post-removal-period
detention decisions."
The Government also argued that because aliens do not have the right to
live at large in the United States, they therefore possess a diminished liberty
interest from all other persons within the national borders.60  The Court
disagreed and stated that the Government did not have to allow the aliens to
live without restrictions in the United States, but rather the aliens could be
forced to adhere to release conditions and could be governmentally supervised
after constitutionally mandated release.6 '
The Court conceded, however, that if Congress had made its intent to
explicitly vest broad discretion in the Attorney General within the statutory
language then the Court would have deferred to that intent.62 However, the
Court did not find any clear statement of Congress' intent to authorize long-
term detention of unremovable aliens.63 While the Government cited to the
discretionary language of the statute, including the word "may,"' the Court
found that Congress did not confer unbridled discretionary authority on the
agency. 5 If Congress had in fact intended to allow indefinite detention, such
an intent would have been manifested explicitly.
66
The Court concluded that absent a clear intent by Congress, the Court
would interpret the statute so as to avoid serious constitutional problems.67
The Court, therefore, concluded that once deportation is no longer reasonably
foreseeable, any further incarceration past the 90-day removal period is not
authorized by the statute."
The Government argued that even under this interpretation, the federal
court hearing the habeas petition would have to defer to the government's
administrative findings about whether the statute's reasonableness limitation
is satisfied without furtherjudicial review.69 The Court disagreed, finding that





64. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) "An alien ordered removed who is inadmissible under section 212 [8
U.S.C.S. § 1182, removable under section 237(aX1XC), 237(a)(2), or 237(a)(4); 8 U.S.C.S. § 1227,
(a)(1)(C), (a)(2), or (a)(4)] or who has been determined by the Attorney General to be a risk to the
community or unlikely to comply with the order of removal, may be detained beyond the removal period
and, if released, shall be subject to the terms of supervision in paragraph (3)" (emphasis added).
65. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 697.
66. Id..
67. Id.




the federal habeas corpus statute7" grants the federal courts the authority to
determine what constitutes the amount of time reasonably necessary to ensure
deportation.7 In making such determinations, the federal habeas court must
inquire whether a period of additional incarceration is necessary to ensure
deportation.72 The habeas court should judge reasonableness in relation to how
well the additional time will effect the stated legislative goals of continued
detention,73 those being the assurance of the alien's presence at the time of
removal, and preventing harms to society at large.74
In the interest of uniformity between the federal courts, the Court adopted
a six-month period as a basic measure of reasonableness.75 After this period,
if an alien shows that good reason exists to believe that there is no significant
chance of deportation then the burden shifts to the Government to rebut that
showing.76 If the government fails to adequately rebut the alien's showing,
then further incarceration will be deemed to be in excess of the agency's
statutory authority and release will be mandated.77 However, this ruling does
not provide automatic release to the alien.7" Any release will come after the
appropriate showing has been made in an administrative hearing.79
The Court overruled the Fifth Circuit's holding that so long as good faith
efforts to remove an alien are ongoing, continued detention is constitutionally
permissible.80 The Court determined that this holding would place too difficult
a burden on the alien to prove that deportation was impossible before gaining
release from confinement.8 Also, the Court disagreed with the Ninth Circuit's
finding that no reasonable likelihood of removal existed based solely on the
fact that no repatriation treaty existed between the United States and
Cambodia. 2 This was held to be error because the Ninth Circuit did not take
into account the likelihood of further successful negotiations between the two
nations.3
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Kennedy, dissented from the majority
opinion on the grounds that he did not believe that there were any situations
70. 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
71. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6).
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where release could be mandated by the courts." A removable alien is no
different from an excludable alien under Mezei.85 Therefore, an alien who has
been ordered to be removed by the INS has no more rights than persons who
are denied entry at the border.8 6 Because the rights enjoyed by aliens who are
under an order of removal are as limited as for persons on the threshold of
entry, Justice Scalia argued that there should be no judicially imposed
impediment to the discretionary authority granted to the Attorney General by
Congress. 7
Justice Kennedy and Chief Justice Rehnquist also dissented from the
majority opinion.8 In part one of their dissent, which Justices Scalia and
Thomasjoined, Kennedy argued that the six-month reasonable time limitation
imposed by the court was inappropriate.89 They argued that the Court
misapplied the doctrine of constitutional avoidance by adopting a non-textual
interpretation of the statute without adequately considering legislative intent.9"
The majority's implied limitation will result in impermissible intrusions by the
judiciary on the other branches of government.9
First, the dissent argued that the legislature's intent was clear.92 Congress'
intent to vest unlimited discretion to detain removable aliens to the Attorney
General was manifested by the fact that they set up a distinction between
dangerous and non-dangerous aliens.93 The existence of provisions which
allow non-detained removable aliens to work during the removal period shows
that Congress had meant to draw a strong distinction between non-detainable
removable aliens and detainable removable aliens.94 The expressed difference
in Congress' treatment of the two different, yet similarly situated, groups
demonstrates that it intended to give the INS more discretion with respect to
the latter group.95 This creation of such distinctions is allowable due to
Congress' plenary power to control immigration.96
The dissent also argued that the interpretation adopted by the majority was
flawed in that it did not adequately take into account the legislative goal of
84. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 704.
86. Id. at 704-705.
87. Id. at 705.
88. Id. at 705-725.
89. Id. at 708 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 706.
91. Id. at 705.
92. Id. at 706.
93. Id. at 707.
94. Id. at 709.




protecting society.97 A substantial number of aliens are detained pending
removal because they represent a risk of flight or risk to the general
population.98 These risks do not vanish after the Court's imposed six-month
reasonableness limitation.99
Secondly, and more controversially, Justice Kennedy argued that there is
a difference in the extent of constitutional protections enjoyed by different
classes of people within the United States.' °° Constitutional rights should not
be universally enjoyed equally by all those within the boundaries of the United
States.'' According to the dissent, the extent of one's constitutional due
process entitlement should be determined by one's status." 2 The dissenting
Justices reasoned that detention is only allowed because an alien, who is under
order of removal, does not have the same rights under the Constitution as a
citizen or non-removable alien."0 3
Justice Kennedy argued that the status of removable aliens should be
equivalent to that of excludable aliens."° Once an alien has been deemed
deportable by the INS, the dissent argued that they should have no
constitutionally protected liberty interest within the United States. 05 Therefore,
the rights of that alien should be the same as for an alien who is halted at the
threshold of entry.'0 6 The classification of an alien as removable does not come
without substantial procedural protections first being afforded.'0 7 Therefore,
no subsequent procedures are mandated by the Due Process Clause.'0 8
Justice Kennedy's dissent also argued that Court's adoption of the 6-
month reasonable time period was unnecessary because federal court review
of agency action is available to prevent arbitrary and capricious denial of the
procedural safeguards afforded the alien in 8 CFR § 241.4 (2001)09. I 0 The
97. Id. at 709.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 708.
100. Id. at 716.
101. Id. at 718.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 719.
104. Id. at 720. See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (holding excludable
aliens, i.e. those aliens who never gain entry to the United States, enjoy greatly diminished Constitutional
protection, and can be detained indefinitely on the threshold of entering the United States without a hearing).
105. Zadvydas, 533 U.S at 720 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 721.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 718.
109. 8 C.F.R. § 241.4 (2001) (providing procedures for post-hearing detention and removal of aliens)
(The agency's actions in accordance with the provisions of 8 C.F.R. § 241.4 would be subject to arbitrary
and capricious review by federal courts under 5 U.S.C.S. § 706(2XA)).
110. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 724 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (stating that the agency's actions in
accordance with the provisions of 8 C.F.R. § 241.4 would be subject to arbitrary and capricious review by
federal courts under 5 U.S.C.S. § 706(2XA)).
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habeas court should only be asked to analyze whether the INS was correct in
determining that a particular removable alien represented a risk of flight or
danger to the community."' It should not be engaged in inquiry as to
repatriation negotiations and other such matters which are related to foreign
affairs and are strictly within the province of the executive branch." 2
CONCLUSION
The September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States caused a radical
shift in political attitudes toward the detention of certain aliens. On September
26, 2001, President George W. Bush signed the Patriot Act" 3 into law.
Section 412 of the Act amends section 236A(a) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act"4 and mandates the detention of any alien certified as
engaging in or actively supporting "terrorist activities."'" 5 The Patriot Act
greatly broadens what types of activities can be classified as "terrorist
activities."'" 6 The Act also potentially allows for indefinite detention of
immigrants upon a finding by the INS that the alien represents a risk.'
In addition to the Patriot Act, 8 C.F.R. 287.3(d) was amended shortly after
September 11 to enable the INS to detain individuals indefinitely with no
warrant and no charges being brought, in times of "emergency or extraordinary
circumstance."'" 8 The Attorney General has broad discretion when deciding
whether to classify an alien as being engaged in "terrorist activities." The
decision can be based on numerous considerations and it could prove very
difficult to try and have an order of detention declared arbitrary and capricious
under these circumstances.
In light of the Supreme Court's recent holding in Zadvydas v. Davis, it is
possible that the Constitution requires more substantial procedural safeguards
to be afforded to these detained aliens, but is not likely. The Court's opinion
in Zadvydas seems to condemn the possibility of indefinite detention, yet
§ 412 of the Patriot Act seems to allow for indefinite detention of suspected
aliens. All that is needed for detention to be ordered is a belief by the Attorney
General that the immigrant is somehow engaged in or supports "terrorist
activities." If deportation cannot be effectuated, then there is the possibility
I11. Id at 724.
112. Id. at 725.
113. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272.
114. The Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1101 § 236(A)(a) (2001).
115. USA PATRIOT Act.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. 8 C.F.R. 287.3(b) (2001).
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that the alien will be subjected to indefinite detention based solely on the
Attorney General's belief.
The Court's opinion in Zadvydas v. Davis seems to allow for this
possibility. The Court mentioned that some special circumstances, including
links to terrorists, may be sufficient to allow for indefinite detention." 9 The
Court also stated in dicta that had Congressional intent been manifested more
explicitly it would have been allowable to vest almost complete discretion in
the Attorney General to impose indefinite detention. 2 ° This was because of
Congress' plenary power to control immigration.' The Patriot Act clearly
places an excessive amount of discretion in the hands of the Attorney
General.'22 Zadvydas'judicially-imposed reasonable-time limitation may be
satisfied by the Attorney General's good-faith belief that the detention is
reasonable and removal is foreseeable.
There is also a possibility that a judicially-imposed reasonable-time
limitation may be required for reasons resting outside of the United States
Constitution. Some instances of detention under the Patriot Act may be
considered violative of legally-operative international human rights accords.
Several human rights treaties, to which the United States is a signatory, place
substantive limitations on our Congress' ability to enact legislation which
would violate treaty provisions.' Protections exist outside of the Constitution
which prevent unreasonable mistreatment of persons by our government.24
The Charming Betsy rule of statutory construction compels any reviewing
court to construe congressional enactments in such a way as to avoid
contravention of international law.'25 International human rights accords
unquestionably proscribe protracted and arbitrary incarceration,'26 so any
subsequent interpretation of the Patriot Act by a U.S. court could have to infer
reasonableness limitations similar to the ones inferred from the statutory text
by the Court in Zadvydas.
127
119. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (citing Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997)).
120. Id. at 697.
121. Id. at 695.
122. USA PATRIOT Act.
123. See The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (111), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.,
U.N. Doc. A/910 (1948); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,999 U.N.T.S.
171 art. 9, § 1.
124. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 art.
9, § I (stating "Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to
arbitrary arrest or detention").
125. See Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 117-118, 2 L. Ed. 208
(1804) (establishing theory of statutory construction requiring courts to interpret acts of Congress in such
a way as to avoid violating international law).
126. See International Covenant, supra note 121.
127. See generally Gordon A. Christenson, Using Human Rights Law to Inform Due Process and
Equal Protection Analyses, 52 U. CIN. L. REv. 3 (1983) (arguing for use of international human rights law
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So far Attorney General John Ashcroft has officially refused to disclose
information about detainees to interested organizations under the Freedom of
Information Act. 28 It is estimated that there are currently over 1 100 persons
who have been detained after September 1 1, 129 and many more who are under
surveillance. 130  The post-September 11 hysteria is leading us toward a
constitutional crisis. Despite ruling on the Zadvydas case less than a year ago,
the Court must revisit this issue in the near future. Action by the high court is
necessary in order to enunciate a more concrete definition of the extent of
constitutional and international treaty protections which must be afforded
aliens within our borders. Until then, the rights of many will remain undefined
and largely unprotected.
Summary and Analysis Prepared by:
David Jordan
in analysis of constitutional protections for aliens).
128. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2001).
129. Tamar Lewin, A Nation Challenged: The Detainees; Dozens of Israeli Jews are Being Kept in
Federal Detention, N.Y. TIMES, Wed., Nov. 21, 2001, at B7.
130. Mark G. Young, What Big Eyes and Ears You Have!: A New Regime for Covert Government
Surveillance, 70 FORDHAM L. REv. 1017 (2001).
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